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Abstract
This paper considerswhy a patenteemay have little incentives to reduce the uncer-
tainty of patent boundary. Clearer patent rights, i.e., when patent examination results
better predict subsequent court decisions, provide better guidance to technology-
specific investment and encourage technology adoption. Undermild conditions, how-
ever, the patentee’s post-adoption payoff decreases in clarity. The patentee prefers to
maintain “fuzzy” patent rights in order to monopolize the use of the technology, or
when promoting technology adoption is not a strong concern. The latter happens
when the patentee, as a pure licensor, has a low (ex ante) quality invention.
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1 Introduction
The United States Patent No. 4,528,643, “System for Reproducing Information in Ma-
terial Objects at a Point of Sale Location,” was awarded to Charles Freeny Jr. in 1985,
and then acquired by the E-Data Corporation in 1994 (and so was also known as the
Freeny patent or E-Data patent). Aggressive enforcement during its statutory life, be-
tween 1985-2002, has created controversy among law practitioners, businessmen, and
in academic circles.1 According to the account of Meurer and Bessen (2008, ch. 9):
‘One of the disputed claim terms was “point of sale location.” The district court
judge interpreted this limitation to mean that the patent did not cover transactions
that occurred in private homes — that is, in the manner associated with consumer
digital e-commerce... On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit interpreted this term
more broadly to cover transactions that occurred within private homes. This meant
that the patent could cover a wide range of e-commerce applications far beyond E-
Data’s original invention...’
The reversal of court decisionwas an unpleasant surprise for the business community,
especially during the rapid expansion of e-commerce in the early 90s.
The E-Data patent case is a typical example where an issued patent provides lit-
tle information about the technology boundary of the patented invention. This pa-
per deals with this aspect of uncertainty in the patent system, i.e., after issuance, the
lingering uncertainty of the patent validity if tested in court, and the boundaries of
technology territory it covers. Because of the exclusive power attached to a valid
and infringed patent, uncertain boundary has non-negligible impacts. It may hinder
technology diffusion or progress. Downstream technology users and future patentees
along the chain of cumulative innovation processmay be reluctant to use the patented
invention, due to the difficulties of clearing the patent “mine field” and surviving in
the “patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). It is even asserted that un-
der this situation patents do not deserve to be called intellectual property rights since
there is insufficient “public notice” that any meaningful property entitlement should
1The invention described in the patent was a kiosk for producing music tapes or other products in
retail stores using digital information. It is reported that E-Data has sent out 75,000 “amnesty” licens-
ing packages, and sued at least 40 companies. News reports and comments are abundant on-line, see,
e.g., http://www.tbtf.com/resource/freeny-timeline.html, http://www.kuesterlaw.com/edata.htm, and
http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/3390851 (last checked on October 23, 2009). See
Meurer and Bessen (2008) for a general discussion.
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deliver (Risch, 2007; Meurer and Bessen, 2008). Patent claims are supposed to delin-
eate the patent coverage on the technology space, but often provide little help in the
assessment of both patent validity and likelihood of infringement.
This uncertainty may come from several sources. Scientific knowledge in some
fields (e.g. software) may be more inherently difficult to codify into written records
than others (e.g. chemistry and pharmaceutical industry). Agency problemwithin the
patent officemay contaminate the “quality” of its decision, and so the informativeness
of an issued patent.2 In this paper, I consider private incentives, namely, a patentee’s
willingness, or unwillingness, to help reduce this uncertainty, and its impact on tech-
nology adoption by the other party. The patentee, either the inventor of the technol-
ogy or a party closely related to the inventor, possesses relevant knowledge about the
patentability issues and technological features of the invention. Furthermore, in most
jurisdictions, patent examination is administered as an ex parte bargaining process be-
tween the patentee and patent examiner. Hence, the patentee is a natural candidate
in the search for private help.
In Section 2, I introduce a model with a patentee and a developer. The developer
wishes to incorporate a new technology into his investment project. After adoption,
he has to exert a non-observable, technology-specific investment effort. Using the
new technology is costly and will expose the developer to the risk of infringing on the
patentee’s patent rights. The patentee’s patent boundary is resolved in a two-stage
process. First, the patent office issues its opinion on whether the patent scope is broad
enough to cover the new technology, then the court has the final say. The patent of-
fice’s decision serves as a signal of the court’s judgment. The patentee can exert some
refinement effort to help the signal from the patent office fall more in line with the
court judgment (Meurer and Nard, 2005). One key assumption is that when decid-
ing whether to use the new technology, the developer observes the refinement effort
chosen by the patentee. Technology adoption therefore depends on the expectation of
how informative the patent office’s decision will be, or the clarity of patent rights.
2In 1996, Gregory Aharonian, a software programmer and industrial observer, commented that ‘... like
many of the 40,000+ software patents to be issued in the 1990’s, the Freeny patent cites no non-patent prior art,
even though before the effective priority date of January 1982, there was much written about electronic commerce
and/or encrypting business communications (providing grounds for an obviousness argument, if not a lack of nov-
elty argument). Had those materials been in the hands of the examiner, I am sure a different set of claims would
have issued...’ (http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/199606/msg00011.html,
last checked on October 23, 2009.)
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In Section 3, I show that the technology-specific effort, which generates hold-up
concerns, will induce a preference toward clearer patent boundaries from the devel-
oper. In the presence of infringement risk, a more informative signal from the patent
office better guides the developer’s investment decision, and increase the developer’s
payoff from adoption of the new technology. Reducing uncertainty encourages tech-
nology adoption.
Increased informativeness, however, also implies that the developer’s investment
will be more responsive to the patent office’s decision. Suppose that ex ante the devel-
oper believes that the court will find infringement with probability 1/2, and consider
two extreme cases. If the patent office’s decision is uninformative, then the developer
will ignore the examination outcome and make the investment decision according
to this probability; investment level is not affected by the patent office’s decision.
But if patent examination perfectly predicts the court ruling, then according to the
patent office’s decision, the developer will make an investment either as if there is
no infringement risk (when the patent office issues a narrow patent indicating no in-
fringement), or as if infringement will happen for sure (when the patent office issues
a broad patent indicating infringement). This more diverse investment adjustment
may not be in the patentee’s interest. Even when risk neutrality is imposed, I get a
fairly mild condition under which the patentee is avert to diverse investment by the
developer.3 Given adoption, to reduce the magnitude of investment adjustment, the
patentee prefers less informative patent office decisions and “fuzzier” patent rights.
Opposite preferences on the precision of the patent office signal imply that the
patentee’s incentives to clarify the patent boundary are driven by her interests in pro-
moting technology adoption. No private refinement efforts will be exerted when the
patenteewants to monopolize the use of the new technology. She will choose the low-
est possible refinement level in order to discourage technology diffusion. Even when
the patentee intends to extract licensing income from the developer, she still has no in-
centive to engage in refinement as long as adoption is guaranteed, or will happenwith
sufficiently high probability. The second scenario applies to a patentee with a suffi-
ciently low ex ante quality invention. That is, without information provided by patent
examination, the patent is very unlikely to be found valid by the court. Hold-up, then,
is less of a threat and the developer will very likely adopt the new technology in spite
3The condition requires that the second-order effect of hold-up (the impact of infringement probability
on investment) is not too large.
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of fuzzy patent rights.
Before concluding the paper in Section 6, I consider whether licensing can solve
the hold-up problem and how it affects refinement incentives in Section 5.4 It turns
out that if licensing takes place early enough, more precisely, if a license is negotiated
before patent examination, it perfectly substitutes for refinement efforts without jeop-
ardizing technology adoption. In other words, if we rely on early licensing to alleviate
the hold-up problem, then fuzzy patents are a side effect we have to live with.
Related literature: The probabilistic nature of patent rights has been introduced
into economic analysis in the past decade. Most studies are concerned with the in-
fringement or validity probability at the litigation stage, where patent disputes are ul-
timately resolved; see Lemley and Shapiro (2005) and papers cited there. Some recent
works have considered a patentee’s strategic choice of patent breadth or scope to in-
fluence a potential entrant’s entry decision and post-entry behavior (Yiannaka and Fulton,
2006; Fulton and Yiannaka, 2008).5 The patentee’s strategic tool considered in this pa-
per, the clarity of patent boundary, is related, but conceptually different from patent
breadth. While patent breadth can be modeled as the infringement or validity prob-
ability in trial, the clarity of patent boundary refers to a higher order of uncertainty
that affects how the infringement or validity assessment is formed. That is, how to
interpret and extract information from a patent office’s decision in order to predict a
court judgment.
Similar to this paper, Farrell and Shapiro (2008) also considers the effect of clari-
fying the patent boundary. A beneficial effect is obtained when the patent is licensed
to several downstream firms that compete against one another, but not when there
is only one licensee or when multiple licensees do not compete. I show that due to
hold-up concerns, reducing the boundary uncertainty also has a benefit of encourag-
ing technology adoption when there is only one downstream user. I also stress the
lack of patentee’s incentives to deal with the uncertain boundary problem. Given lim-
ited participation by third parties, better patent examination may have to come from
public initiatives. I then provide an argument against Lemley (2001)’s “rationally ig-
4Gans et al. (2007) empirically tests the impact of uncertainty on the timing of patent licensing. They
found that the likelihood of licensing increases after the patent office’s decision because of lower uncer-
tainty. In this paper, however, I do not consider the players’ optimal timing to licensing.
5In their seminal paper, Greena and Scotchmer (1995) also showed that less-than-full patent breadthmay
improve the patentee’s interests in ex ante bargaining by weakening a second-generation patentee’s threat
of no entry ex post.
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norant patent office.”6
To the best ofmy knowledge, legal scholars providemost discussion about “fuzzy”
patent rights and the lack of public notice. Their efforts, nevertheless, are more di-
rected toward whether certain legal rules should be enacted or abolished to alleviate
this problem.7 In this paper, I take one step back and investigate why a patentee may
lack incentives to help reduce uncertainty associated with her patent rights. Under-
standing one important source of the problem, in my view, is a necessary step toward
finding solutions.
This paper also joins recent efforts to fill a gap in the literature, namely, the ne-
glected role of patent office. My analysis includes patent examination as a possi-
ble way to mitigate uncertainty faced by the downstream technology user, and is
complementary to recent works on patent examination per se, which focus on strate-
gic interaction between patentees and the patent office (Caillaud and Ducheˆne, 2005;
Langinier and Marcoul, 2008, 2009; Prady, 2008; Shuett, 2008).
2 Model
There are two players: a patentee and a developer. The patentee seeks patent protec-
tion for her invention, and is granted a patent with an uncertain boundary covering
a technology field. The developer wishes to develop a product in order to enter the
downstream market related to that field. Both players are risk neutral and protected
by limited liability.
Before product development, the developer has to incur an “entry fee,” or a tech-
nology adoption cost c f ≥ 0 to learn the fundamental knowledge of the field. The
adoption cost c f is only known to the developer, while the patentee holds a belief that
c f is distributed on [0,∞), with F(·) as the CDF. Assume that F(c f ) is continuously
differentiable and F′(c f ) > 0 over the relevant range.
After incurring the cost c f and acquiring the basic knowledge, the developer ex-
erts a technology-specific effort, or the investment effort e ∈ [0, 1], at a private cost
cE(e) ≥ 0. To fix the idea, this effort is interpreted as the probability that the developer
successfully commercializes a product in the downstream market. It may be techno-
6See Chiou (2008) for another argument based on the case selection issue of private litigations.
7Meurer and Nard (2005) and Lichtman (2005) debate the “doctrine of equivalents,” on which the court
relies to expand patent scope beyond what is specified in patent claims. Risch (2007) attacks the “broadest
reasonable constructing rule” used by patent examiners in interpreting patent claims.
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logical in nature, such as the successful development of a new functionality; or a pure
marketing strategy, such as the advertisement expense; or both, such as the efforts
exerted in finding a profitable new product design in a proper market niche. Assume
an increasing and strictly convex investment cost, with c
′′′
E (e) ≥ 0, cE(0) = c
′
E(0) = 0,
and a sufficiently large c′E(1) that guarantees interior solutions. The investment ef-
fort is the developer’s private information. To gain more insight, in several accounts
I will impose quadratic investment cost, cE(e) = e
2/(2K), and uniform distribution,
F(c f ) = νc f for c f ∈ [0, 1/ν].
The developer’s product may fall into the patentee’s patent claims. The resolution
of patent boundary consists of two steps: patent office examination aP and court ver-
dict aC. There is no legal or management cost to obtain either decision. The patentee
or developer can appeal the patent office’s decision to the court, but the issue is fully
settled once the court rules. Assume that both decisions are binary, aP and aC ∈ {0, 1}.
When aP = 1, the patent office issues a favorable decision supporting the patentee’s
claim over the new technology; and if aP = 0, the patentee’s claim is not approved
by the patent office.8 Similarly, when aC = 1 (aC = 0) the court upholds (strikes
down, respectively) the patentee’s rights over the technology under dispute. Denote
α ∈ (0, 1) as the common ex ante belief that the court will side with the patentee,
α = Pr(aC = 1), which measures the prior assessment of the patentee’s technological
contribution in terms of patent law requirement. I shall refer to it as invention quality.
The patent office’s decision aP provides some information about the final reso-
lution of patent boundary aC. The patentee’s behavior during patent prosecution
will affect the quality of patent office’s decision, and so the information contained
in this signal. The patentee may search and disclose prior arts to the patent exam-
iner (Langinier and Marcoul, 2008), communicate with and explain to the examiner
to help the latter better understand the invention and its difference with other inven-
tions, and more carefully draft the patent claims and specifications in the application
package (Meurer and Nard, 2005; Risch, 2007), etc. I assume that the patentee can ex-
ert a refinement effort r to sharpen the predictive power of the patent examination
result, as captured by the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (Symmetric refinement) Pr(aP = aC) = r ∈ [r, 1], for both aP = aC ∈
8Thus the patent office examination outcomes have a broader interpretation than simply issuance or
rejection. When aP = 0, a patent can be granted, but an important claim in the original application has been
trimmed by the examiner.
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{0, 1}, where r > 1/2 but is sufficiently close to 1/2.
With probability r the patent office will make the same decision as the court. Con-
trary to Meurer and Bessen (2006), where a higher refinement effort is assumed to
always improve the patentee’s prospects in court, I assume symmetric impact of re-
finement.9 A higher refinement effort will increase the predictive power of the patent
office’s decision both when aP = 0 and 1. When the signal is directly observed by the
(benevolent) patent examiner, symmetry implies an unbiased examiner who will not
by systematically misled by the patentee in one direction or the other. Another justifi-
cation can be found in the patent law. Current U.S. patent prosecution procedure does
not require a patentee to conduct prior art search, but does impose “a duty of candor
and good faith” (Rule 56), which obliges the disclosure of any information known to
the patentee that may be material to patentability issues. Its violation may render a
patent unenforceable. Hence a patentee may have questionable incentives to exert r
and search prior arts, but may be even more hesitant to lie and hide information in
hand. In Section 4, I keep the symmetry assumption but let the patentee observe the
signal aP. I then check her incentive to reveal the signal to the patent office and how
it affects the refinement decision.
I impose a lower bound on the possible refinement effort. This minimal level rmay
come from the patent examiner’s effort or the degree to which the court will defer to
the patent office’s decision.10 Exerting an effort r entails a cost cR ≥ 0, with cR and
c′R ≥ 0, c
′′
R > 0, cR(r) = c
′
R(r) = 0, and c
′
R(1) = ∞. I will also assume that c
′′
R is large
enough to “force” the concavity of patentee’s payoff in the refinement effort.
I assume that the effort r chosen by the patentee is observable to the developer.
This is supported by the “early publication” requirement in the European and (to
some extent) U.S. patent systems.11 Under this requirement, patent applications and
examination records are made public after a certain period (generally 18 months). Via
9One way to reconcile the two approaches is to assume that the game ends after the patent office issues
the unfavorable decision aP = 0. For instance, the patentee does not appeal the rejection decision by the
patent office. The negative impact of refinement on patent power (when aP = 0) then becomes irrelevant.
10Although introduced for technical reason (see footnote 16), it might be too pessimistic to say that patent
examiners have no input at all and so without the patentee’s effort the examination results will be totally
uninformative.
11In Europe, all patent applications have to be published after 18 months of filing, unless they are with-
drawn or rejected prior to 18 months of filing. In the U.S., early publication is exempted only if the patentee
does not seek international patent protection. Adams (2003) compares early publication procedures in the
U.S. and Europe, including what information is disclosed by each patent office.
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these documents, third parties may be able to roughly figure out the “quality” of a
given application and thus the patent office’s decision. I discuss the case of unobserv-
able refinement efforts in Section 4.
Given α and r, the probability distribution of the patent office’s decision is
Pr(aP = 1|α, r) ≡ q = αr+ (1− α)(1− r), (1)
Pr(aP = 0|α, r) = 1− q = α(1− r) + (1− α)r. (2)
Knowing α and r and after observing the patent office’s decision, the developer up-
dates his beliefs about the court’s decision:
αˆ1 ≡ Pr(aC = 1|α, r, aP = 1) =
αr
q
, (3)
αˆ0 ≡ Pr(aC = 1|α, r, aP = 0) =
α(1− r)
1− q
. (4)
These updated beliefs will be referred to as “patent power,” for they measure the
probability of infringing an issued patent. When r = 1/2, αˆ0 = αˆ1 = α, the patent
office’s decision is totally uninformative. When r > 1/2, αˆ0 < α < αˆ1, and
∂αˆ1
∂r
=
α(1− α)
q2
> 0 and
∂αˆ0
∂r
= −
α(1− α)
(1− q)2
< 0. (5)
A higher refinement effort will increase (decrease) the patent power when the patent
office sides with (against, respectively) the patentee.
Referring to Figure 1, the timing of the game is as follows:
• At time 1 the patentee exerts an observable refinement effort r;
• at time 1.5, after learning r but before knowing the patent office’s decision, the
developer learns the value of adoption cost c f and decides whether to enter;
• at time 2, the patent office issues the decision aP ∈ {0, 1};
• at time 2.5, after adopting the new technology, the developer makes technology-
specific investment effort e; and
• at time 3, the court makes a final decision aC ∈ {0, 1}.
Note that the technology adoption decision is made before the patent office’s deci-
sion. This scenario captures a common situation in high-tech, fast-moving industries
where important decisions, such as which technologies to incorporate into a standard
or which standard to adopt for product development, have to be made under the
threat of potential patent disputes. There is not time to wait for the lengthy patent ex-
amination to reduce, but may not fully eliminate, uncertainty. By contrast, the invest-
ment effort is exerted after patent examination in order to keep the hold-up element.
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Figure 1: Timing
For my purposes, it suffices to have any adjustment by the developer according to
the patent office’s decision. In Section 4, I examine a “late adoption” scenario, where
the adoption decision is delayed to time 2.5, after learning the patent office’s decision.
The main results are robust to this alternative timing with additional assumptions
on the investment cost cE and distribution function F(c f ), and they are satisfied with
quadratic cost cE and uniform distribution F(c f ).
Concerning payoffs, I assume that the patentee, as a pioneering patentee, needs
not make any further investment. For instance, she may already operate in the down-
streammarket. Her payoff, however, may be affected by the entry of the developer. If
the developer does not adopt the technology, the patentee receives a revenue u10 ≥ 0
and the developer receives zero revenue. This pair of revenues also applies when the
developer spends c f and adopts the new technology, but fails to develop a product
and thus cannot enter the downstream market, an event with probability 1− e. With
probability e the developer successfully conducts the investment project and can be
present in the market. In this case, the revenues are determined by the prevailing
market participation profile. Denote uij and vji as the patentee’s and the developer’s
revenues, respectively, where i = 1 (j = 1) means that the patentee (the developer,
respectively) is operating on the market; and when i = 0 (j = 0), she (he, respectively)
exits the market.
Assume there is no exit cost, and for all i, j ∈ {0, 1}, u1j and v1i ≥ 0, u0j = v0i = 0,
and v11 > 0. Revenues from downstreammarket operation are non-negative, and exit
generates zero income. Define
pi ≡ max{u10, v10, u11 + v11} (6)
as the maximal joint revenue from the downstreammarket. When pi ∈ {u10, v10}, it is
privately efficient to let one player exit the market. (The case of pi = u00 + v00 = 0 is
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obviously uninteresting.)12
To close the model, notice that licensing can take place on several occasions: after
the court’s decision (ex post licensing), after patent issuance but before the developer
makes technology-specific investment (interim licensing), and before patent issuance
(ex ante licensing). The main analysis is conducted under ex post licensing only, which
takes place only when the developer’s investment project succeeds and the court up-
holds the patentee’s claim, aC = 1. In this case, the court grants the patentee the
injunction power to shut down the developer, which serves as the threat point at bar-
gaining. When aC = 0, the developer can freely use the technology, and, absent patent
rights, the antitrust authority will challenge any attempts to monopolize the market.
At license negotiation, I assign the whole bargaining power to the patentee.
This setting is chosen to illustrate the main point in a simpler way. As mentioned
earlier, for robustness check, variations of the basic model are examined in Section 4,
including the cases of unobservable r, information revelation by the patentee, and late
adoption. Section 5 analyzes other licensing opportunities.
3 Patentee’s and Developer’s Opposite Preferences
on Refinement
This section illustrates the basic trade-offs underlying the patentee’s refinement deci-
sion. Suppose that only ex post licensing is available, and that the developer has paid
c f and successfully built a product. In other events, the game ends and the patentee
gets a revenue u10 and the developer gets zero.
Consider the court’s decision. When aC = 0, the court rejects the patentee’s claim
over the invention and the developer can freely use the new technology. The returns
from market are u11 for the patentee and v11 for the developer, respectively. When
aC = 1, the court upholds the patentee’s claim. With an injunction and full bargaining
power, the patentee can realize the maximal return pi by either shutting down the
developer (when pi = u10) or offering a license which fully extracts the surplus and
leaves zero return to the developer (as in his outside option of exiting).
12This payoff structure excludes any direct effect of patent rights on downstream revenues. For instance,
in order to avoid infringement, the developer may want to invent or design around the patent with a lower
revenue. To the extent that this (inefficient) adjustment could be captured by the specific investment, I
believe there is only minor loss of generality.
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At time 2.5, with the updated belief αˆ, the developer’s optimal investment effort eˆ
is determined by
eˆ ≡ argmax
e
(1− αˆ)ev11 − cE(e) ⇒ FOC : (1− αˆ)v11 ≡ c
′
E(eˆ). (7)
Denote the optimal investment efforts eˆ0 ≡ eˆ(αˆ0) and eˆ1 ≡ eˆ(αˆ1), corresponding to the
patent office’s decision, and define vˆ ≡ (1− αˆ)eˆv11 − cE(eˆ). The developer’s expected
payoff from technology adoption is
V(r; α) = qvˆ(αˆ1) + (1− q)vˆ(αˆ0). (8)
At time 1.5, the developer adopts the new technology when V(r; α) ≥ c f .
With refinement effort r, the patentee expects technology adoption to occur with
probability F(V(r; α)). Upon adoption, given the patent power αˆ, at time 2.5 the
patentee’s expected payoff (gross of refinement cost) is
uˆ(αˆ) = (1− eˆ)u10 + eˆ [αˆpi + (1− αˆ)u11] = u10 + eˆ · D(αˆ), (9)
whereD(αˆ) ≡ αˆ(pi− u11)+ u11− u10. When the developer’s project fails, the patentee
receives u10. When the developer succeeds, the patentee receives pi if her patent rights
are upheld in court, and u11 otherwise. The term D(αˆ) reflects how the developer’s
success affects the patentee. Besides a direct impact u11 − u10 ≷ 0, the patentee gets
another source of revenue αˆ(pi − u11) ≥ 0 via her patent rights. The net impact may
be positive or negative. It is negative when the two players compete fiercely on the
market so that u11 < u10 and the patent power αˆ is low. By contrast, if the patentee
does not participate in the downstream market and only gathers licensing income,
u11 = u10 = 0, it is always positive.
Given technology adoption, the patentee’s expected payoff (gross of refinement
cost) is
uτ = quˆ(αˆ
1) + (1− q)uˆ(αˆ0), (10)
which is a convex combination between the two patent examination outcomes. When
making the refinement decision at time 1, the patentee’s expected payoff (net of re-
finement cost) is
U = [1− F(V)] u10 + F(V)uτ − cR = u10 + F(V)(uτ − u10)− cR. (11)
With probability 1 − F(V), the developer does not adopt the technology and the
patentee gets a revenue u10. With probability F(V), technology adoption occurs and
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the patentee’s post-adoption payoff is uτ. Assuming that c
′′
R is large enough, the pay-
off U is then strictly concave in r. The next step is to derive players’ preferences
toward the refinement effort r from these payoffs.
Hold-up concerns imply that the developer’s payoff vˆ is decreasing and strictly
convex in patent power:
dvˆ
dαˆ
= −eˆv11 ≤ 0, and
d2vˆ
dαˆ2
= −v11
deˆ
dαˆ
=
v211
c
′′
E(eˆ)
> 0, (12)
for deˆ/dαˆ = −v11/c
′′
E < 0.
For the patentee, the impact of patent power is
duˆ
dαˆ
= D(αˆ)
deˆ
dαˆ
+ (pi − u11)eˆ, and
d2uˆ
dαˆ2
= 2(pi − u11)
deˆ
dαˆ
+ D(αˆ)
d2 eˆ
dαˆ2
, (13)
where d2 eˆ/dαˆ2 = [v11/(c
′′
E)
2](deˆ/dαˆ)c
′′′
E ≤ 0. Because pi > u11,
13 the payoff uˆ is
increasing in αˆ if D(αˆ) is negative, or, when it is positive, if the absolute size of
D(αˆ)(deˆ/dαˆ) is not too large.
More importantly, uˆ is strictly concave in αˆ as long as the second-order effect of
hold-up, d2 eˆ/dαˆ2, is not too large. In fact, d2uˆ/dαˆ2 is non-negative at some αˆ only
when
D(αˆ)
v11
(c
′′
E)
2
c
′′′
E ≤ −2(pi − u11) < 0, (14)
which requires D(αˆ)c
′′′
E < 0. When c
′′′
E = 0, i.e., the investment cost cE takes a
quadratic form, uˆ is concave in αˆ.14
The curvatures of vˆ and uˆ generate players’ preferences toward the clarity of patent
boundary.15 The following lemma establishes the mathematical result. (All proofs are
relegated to Appendix A.)
Lemma 1. If a differentiable function δ(αˆ) is strictly convex (strictly concave) in αˆ, then the
convex combination ∆(r) = qδ(αˆ1) + (1− q)δ(αˆ0) is strictly increasing (strictly decreasing,
respectively) in r.
13If pi = u11, then v11 = v01 = 0. The developer will never use the new technology.
14If c
′′′
E > 0, condition (14) fails when D(αˆ) ≥ 0 is greater than zero for all αˆ, which is true when the
patentee is a pure licensor, u11 = u10 = 0. In the case of pi = u10, it requires that v11c
′′′
E < 2(c
′′
E)
2.
15In the late adoption scenario considered in Section ??, the convexity requirement is imposed on the
“penetration probability,” F(vˆ)eˆ. This is the probability that under the alternative timing, the developer will
use the technology and successfully conduct the project and then introduce the product. Assuming convex-
ity of F(vˆ)eˆ, which is satisfied under uniform distribution and quadratic investment cost, both Proposition
1 and 2 hold in the late adoption case (see Proposition 5).
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Figure 2: Refinement and post-adoption payoffs
Referring to Figure 2(a), by strict convexity, the developer’s return from adoption
V(r; α) is strictly increasing in r. Notice that
qαˆ1 + (1− q)αˆ0 = αr+ α(1− r) = α. (15)
This property guarantees that, regardless of r, V(r; α), as a convex combination be-
tween vˆ(αˆ1) and vˆ(αˆ0), always lies on the vertical line from α. Intuitively, more infor-
mative patent office’s decisions provide better guidance about infringement risk and
allow the developer to adjust investment as a response. The developer has higher
incentives to adopt the new technology in the expectation of more “public notice.”
When condition (14) fails so that uˆ is globally strictly concave in αˆ, for all r > 1/2,
uτ = quˆ(αˆ
1) + (1− q)uˆ(αˆ0) < uˆ(qαˆ1 + (1− q)αˆ0) = uˆ(α). (16)
Contrary to the developer, the patentee prefers totally uninformative patent exam-
ination (r = 1/2) to some clarity (r > 1/2). The patentee dislikes more diverse
investment by the developer, as will be induced by more diverse αˆ1 and αˆ0. Her
post-adoption payoff, uτ, is strictly decreasing in r, as shown in Figure 2(b).
Proposition 1. (Preferences conflict) Suppose that only ex post licensing is available. Due to
hold-up concerns, the developer prefers more informative patent examination outcomes. More
refinement increases encourages technology adoption.
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When condition (14) fails, given adoption, the patentee prefers less informative patent
examination outcomes. More refinement reduces the patentee’s post-adoption payoff uτ.
This conflict in preferences establishes the basic trade-off in the patentee’s refine-
ment decision. Suppose that condition (14) doesn’t hold. Post-adoption, the patentee
and developer have opposite interests in refinement, ∂V/∂r > 0 and ∂uτ/∂r < 0 for
all r ∈ [r, 1]. At the refinement stage (time 1), the patentee chooses r ∈ [r, 1] that
maximizes the payoff U = u10 + F(V)(uτ − u10)− cR.
16
By ∂uτ/∂r < 0, the patentee has no refinement incentives when F(V) = 1 at r = r,
i.e., when technology adoption concern is absent. Suppose that 0 < F(V) < 1 and
F′(V) > 0 for r ∈ [r, 1]. The patentee’s first-order condition is
∂U
∂r
= F(V)
[
F′
F
(V)
∂V
∂r
(uτ − u10) +
∂uτ
∂r
]
− c′R. (17)
The trade-off, if any, to pin down the optimal refinement effort lies between higher
adoption probability and larger post-adoption revenue. Whether there is such a trade-
off crucially depends on the patentee’s business strategy in the downstreammarket.
Consider two market structures. When pi = u10, the patentee will shut down the
developer when obtaining the injunction. That is, the patentee will use the patent
to exclude competition in the downstream market. Technology adoption harms the
patentee: ∀αˆ ∈ [0, 1), D(αˆ) < 0 and so uˆ(αˆ) < u10. Post-adoption payoff is smaller
than when there is no adoption, uτ < u10. The patentee wants to discourage tech-
nology adoption. In order to do so, she will not exert any refinement effort, r = r,
whatever her invention quality α.
In the second scenario, I assume that u11 = u10 = 0, and so pi = v11, i.e., the
patentee is a pure licensor and does not participate in downstream market. This is a
special case of pi = u11 + v11, where after infringement the patentee will grant an ex
post license and extract a licensing fee v11 from the developer. The patentee’s post-
adoption payoff is
uτ =
[
qeˆ1αˆ1 + (1− q)eˆ0αˆ0
]
v11. (18)
The patentee may want to exert some refinement effort in order to boost technology
16 Below I will consider a quadratic investment cost cE, under which both ∂V/∂r = ∂uτ/∂r = 0 at
r = 1/2. If I let r = 0 while maintaining c′R(1/2) = 0, r = 1/2 will become a critical point. Together with
the concavity of U, the optimal refinement is always r = 1/2. The assumption of r > 1/2 rules out this
case.
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adoption and the chance that she can collect licensing payment. To gain more insight,
let’s consider the special case of a quadratic investment cost.
Example 1. (Quadratic investment cost) Suppose that cE(e) = e
2/(2K), with 1/K > v11
so that the optimal eˆ(αˆ) < 1 for all αˆ. Since c
′′′
E = 0, condition (14) fails. The patentee
has a strictly concave preference toward patent power.
By the quadratic form, eˆ = (1 − αˆ)Kv11, vˆ = (1 − αˆ)
2v211(K/2), and V(r; α) =
Ψ(1− α)2v211(K/2), where Ψ ≡ [(1− r)
2/q] + [r2/(1− q)]. When pi = v11 and u11 =
u10 = 0, uτ = Λα(1 − α)v11Kpi, where Λ ≡ [r(1 − r)]/[q(1 − q)]. The impacts of
refinement effort are ∂Ψ/∂r > 0 > ∂Λ/∂r, for all r > 1/2.17 A higher refinement
effort encourages technology adoption but at the same time reduces the patentee’s
post-adoption payoff. (More details can be found in the appendix.)
Concerning the patentee’s optimal refinement decision, the necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the patentee to exert any refinement effort is, when evaluated at
r = r > 1/2,
F′
F
(V)V
αΛ
(1− α)Ψ
> 1 ⇔
F′
F
(V)V >
(1− α)Ψ
αΛ
. (19)
The right-hand side of the condition is decreasing in α, and when α → 0, Ψ/Λ → 1.
Therefore, as long as F′V/F is uniformly bounded,18 this condition is less likely to
hold when α is small enough. For instance, F′V/F = 1 under uniform distribution,
and this condition becomes[
α− (1− α)2
]
r(1− r) > α(1− α)
[
r3 + (1− r)3
]
, (20)
which won’t be true when α ≤ (1− α)2. In addition, because r > 1/2, it is less likely
to satisfy when r becomes larger. Higher efforts from the patent examiner will crowd
out or substitute the patentee’s refinement efforts. ‖
Proposition 2. (Low private refinement). Suppose that only ex post licensing is available. The
patentee will not exert any refinement effort when F(V) = 1 at r and so technology adoption
is not a concern, or when pi = u10 and so the patentee prefers to monopolize the market.
When the patentee is a pure licensor (u11 = u10 = 0 and so pi = v11), and the developer
has a quadratic investment cost function, cE(e) = e
2/(2K), the patentee will exert some
refinement effort r > r if and only if condition (19) holds at r = r. When F′V/F is uniformly
bounded, this condition will not hold when α is low enough.
17At r = 1/2, both ∂Ψ/∂r = ∂Λ/∂r = 0.
18Roughly speaking, the requirement of uniformly bounded F′V/F = (dF/dV)/(F/V)means that there
is no sudden jump in percentage of probability density.
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4 Implications and Robustness Checks
This section is devoted to robustness checks and implications of the results.
 Sabotage examiner’s effort: The result of no private refinement also implies
that the patentee has an incentive to sabotage the examiner’s effort, i.e., to reduce r.
This effect has an important implication for patent system reform. If the patentee is
required to conduct a thorough search and disclose prior arts (supposing this rule can
be effectively enforced), then she may want to provide both relevant and irrelevant
informationwith the intention of creating information overflow for the examiner. This
strategic interaction between the patentee and examiner is an interesting topic for
future research.19
 Welfare: With additional structure such as the R&D cost and monopoly dead-
weight loss, different effects of refinement identified above can be incorporated into
a formal welfare analysis. It wouldn’t be difficult to imagine a social trade-off be-
tween encouraging technology adoption (thus raises static efficiency) and boosting
R&D incentives. The question is, even when fuzzier patent rights increase the paten-
tee’s payoffs, whether this uncertainty would be a good policy instrument to induce
innovation? A thorough analysis would require a larger set of policy tools, such as
patent length, patentability requirement, and infringement remedy.
 IPR strategy and business model: If the patentee has an interest in obtaining
the monopoly position, pi = u10, but needs to make some investment in order to enter
the downstream market, then the same reasoning suggests that the patentee would
not want to engage in refinement at all. Again, a higher refinement effort will attract
more entry and reduce the prospect of maintaining the monopoly, for the patentee
will have to rely on the court’s injunction to exclude competitors. This suggests a
relationship between a patentee’s refinement policy and business strategy. At the
aggregate level, it would be interesting to investigate the prevailing market structure
and the degree of uncertainty in patent rights across industries.
19Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) raises this issue as an potential application of their strategic commu-
nication game, but does not provide a full analysis. Langinier and Marcoul (2008) explicitly models the
patentee’s prior art search and revelation decision, but does not allow the possibility of information over-
flow. Caillaud and Ducheˆne (2005) consider the overload problem facing the patent office. But the problem
comes from excessive volume of applications, not information contained in each application.
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 The third case: The case of pi = v10 is somewhat between the two cases pi = u10
and pi = u11 + v11. When pi = v10, post infringement, the patentee will exit the
market and grant the developer a license in exchange for a payment, and D(αˆ) =
αˆ(v10− u11) + u11− u10. If the developer exerts a positive effect on the patentee at the
downstreammarket (u11 ≥ u10), or if u11 < u10 but the magnitude of negative impact
is not too large, then uτ > u10 and the patentee faces the same trade-off between
encouraging adoption F(V) and raising post-adoption payoff uτ as in the case of pi =
u11 + v11.
However, if the competition is so fierce that uτ ≤ u10, as in the case of pi = u10,
then the patentee will again not exert any refinement effort. Despite the assumption
that post infringement the patentee can extract the full surplus v10 via licensing, this
would happen because ex post licensing only takes place when the court upholds the
patent rights.20
Non-observable refinement: When the refinement effort r is not observable to
the developer, it is even easier to obtain the no refinement result. In this case, a ratio-
nal expectation equilibrium requires that, along the equilibrium path, the developer
correctly guesses the equilibrium refinement effort exerted by the patentee, and the
latter won’t secretly deviate from the equilibrium level.
Suppose that r˜ > r is an equilibrium refinement effort, with corresponding q˜ ≡
αr˜ + (1− α)(1− r˜), α˜1 ≡ (αr˜)/q˜ and α˜0 ≡ [α(1 − r˜)]/(1 − q˜). The developer’s ex-
pected payoff from technology adoption is V˜ ≡ q˜vˆ(α˜1) + (1− q˜)vˆ(α˜0). After adop-
tion, the developer exerts an effort e˜i ≡ eˆ(α˜i), according to the patent examination
outcome i = aP ∈ {0, 1}. When making the refinement decision, the patentee’s payoff
is U = u10 + F(V˜)(uτ − u10)− cR.
Since the developer cannot detect the patentee’s deviation, if the latter chooses an-
other refinement level, r′ 6= r˜, along the equilibrium path the developer will choose
investment (e˜0, e˜1), which leading to the same adoption probability F(V˜). The devi-
ation only affects the patentee’s post-adoption payoff uτ through the distribution of
20With quadratic investment cost,
uτ − u10 = (1− α)v11K [αΛ(v10− u11) + (u11 − u10)] , (21)
which is negative when α is small enough.
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patent examination outcome q(r′) and patent power αˆi(r′), i ∈ {0, 1}, with
uτ − u10 = q(r
′)e˜1D(αˆ1(r′)) + [1− q(r′)]e˜0D(αˆ0(r′))
= α(pi − u11)
[
r′ e˜1 + (1− r′)e˜0
]
+ (u11 − u10)
[
q(r′)e˜1 + [1− q(r′)]e˜0
]
.
(22)
When this payoff difference is decreasing in r′, the patentee has an incentive to deviate
and choose a lower refinement effort than r˜. In this case, the only rational expectation
equilibrium is no private refinement.
By e˜1 < e˜0 and
∂(uτ − u10)
∂r′
= (e˜1 − e˜0) [α(pi − u10)− (1− α)(u11 − u10)] , (23)
in equilibrium, a necessary condition for the patentee to exert any refinement effort is
thus
α
1− α
<
u11 − u10
pi − u10
. (24)
This condition may hold only when u11 > u10, namely, the patentee directly benefits
from the developer’s product at the downstream market (e.g., due to some comple-
mentarity between the two’s products). It does not hold, and so the patentee does
not exert any refinement effort when the patentee wants to monopolize the market
(pi = u10), or when she is a pure licensor (u10 = u11 = 0).
Proposition 3. (Unobservable refinement) Suppose that the developer cannot observe the paten-
tee’s refinement effort. The patentee has any incentive to exert refinement effort only if con-
dition (24) holds, which does not hold when the patentee wants to monopolize the market, or
when the patentee is a pure licensor.
 Information disclosure: Suppose that the patentee, not the patent office (i.e.,
examiner), learns the signal aP ∈ {0, 1}, e.g., by searching for relevant prior arts.
The patentee then decides whether to reveal her information during examination. To
simplify the analysis, the refinement effort is still assumed to be observable by the
developer, and the patent office plays a passive role and issues the patent together
with the information submitted by the patentee.
The symmetric refinement assumption is maintained in the information-generating
process. It implies that, when searching for prior arts and then forming a more precise
assessment about the patentability of her patent, the patentee cannot systematically
avoid information that would tilt her judgement in one way or the other. Whether
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she would reveal information is the focus here, as well as how this decision affects the
refinement incentive.21
The developer, by observing α and r, knows that the patentee has two possible
types, αˆ1 and αˆ0, with probability q and 1− q. Whether the developer learns the true
patent power depends on the extent to which the patentee transmits this information
to the developer, i.e., the outcome of a signaling game. For the patentee, her available
strategies are constrained by the properties of information and legal environment.
That is, the extent to which she can conceal, manipulate, or even forge documents.
Consider two extreme cases. When the signal aP is soft information, the reports
that the patentee can send to the patent office are not constrained by the informa-
tion she actually holds in hand. The patentee’s report space is the same as her type
space. In the proof of the following proposition, I show that there is no separating
equilibrium, and a pooling equilibrium always exists. In a pooling equilibrium, the
developer learns nothing from the patent examination outcome. His equilibrium be-
lief remains at the ex ante level. The patentee cannot transmit her private information
to the developer, and so won’t bother to gather information in the first place. There is
no private refinement.
Next, suppose that the signal aP is hard information, i.e., the patentee can only con-
ceal discovered information. To capture this, let’s introduce another signal ∅ which
means that the patentee remains silent and does not submit any information dur-
ing examination. The patentee’s message space, then, is type-dependent. When the
patentee’s true type is αˆi, her report can only be αˆi or ∅.
Contrary to the soft information case, the restrictive message space guarantees the
existence of a separating equilibrium. But the pooling equilibrium exists only when
pi > u10 > u11 and the patentee exerts a sufficiently high refinement effort. There is
only separating equilibrium, and thus previous results hold when the patentee wants
to monopolize the technology use or when she is a pure licensor. Note that, even if it
exists and the patentee does spend a large effort to attain the pooling equilibrium, the
developer’s equilibrium investment and adoption payoffs are determined according
to the ex ante invention quality α, and patent examination is totally uninformative.
Overall, after taking into account the patentee’s incentive to disclose information,
either the results are the same (as in hard information and when the separating equi-
21Langinier and Marcoul (2008) also analyzes the patentee’s decisions to collect and then reveal prior
arts. In their model, however, the amount of prior arts gathered is assumed to be uninformative about the
patentability of the invention.
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Figure 3: Timing with late adoption
librium prevails), or there is no private refinement (as in soft information).
Proposition 4. (Information revelation) Suppose that the patentee learns the signal aP. When
this signal is soft information, there is only pooling equilibrium at the examination stage, and
the patentee will not exert any refinement effort.
When this signal is hard information, there is always a separating equilibrium. The pooling
equilibrium may exist only when pi > u10 > u11 and r is large enough.
 Late adoption: Referring to Figure 3, suppose that the adoption decision is taken
at time 2.5, after learning the patent office’s decision. Given the patent power αˆ, the
developer will incur c f when vˆ(αˆ) ≥ c f . The developer will adopt the technology and
successfully build the product with probability F(vˆ(αˆ))eˆ(αˆ). This probability plays a
central role in this remark, and is referred to as the extent of technology penetration.
Stronger patent power, again, discourages technology penetration:
d
dαˆ
F(vˆ)eˆ = F′(vˆ)
dvˆ
deˆ
eˆ+ F(vˆ)
deˆ
dαˆ
≤ 0. (25)
A higher infringement risk reduces both the developer’s adoption incentives as well
as the effort he will exert post-adoption. Similar to previous analysis, refinement af-
fects the overall technologypenetration, qF(vˆ(αˆ1))eˆ(αˆ1)+ (1− q)F(vˆ(αˆ0))eˆ(αˆ0), through
its impact on the distribution of patent examination outcome as well as patent power.
The curvature of the penetration probability with respect to αˆ, again, captures whether
refinement enhances or reduces technology penetration. In the rest of the remark, the
following assumption is maintained. It is satisfied, for instance, when F(·) is uniform
distribution and cE is quadratic.
22
Assumption 2. F(vˆ)eˆ is strictly convex in αˆ.
22In general it holds when the second-order effect of patent power on technology penetration is not
dominated by F
′′
and d2eˆ/dαˆ2.
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The patentee’s payoff, given the patent power αˆ, is uˆL(αˆ) = u10 + F(vˆ)eˆD(αˆ).
When choosing the refinement effort at time 1, the patentee’s expected revenue is
UL = quˆL(αˆ1) + (1− q)uˆL(αˆ0). When c
′′
R is sufficiently large, the program maxrU
L −
cR is strictly concave in r. To pin down the shape of uˆ
L under Assumption 2, let ’s
consider the patentee’s role at the downstream market. When the patentee prefers
to monopolize the market (pi = u10), uˆ
L is strictly increasing and concave in αˆ. By
Lemma 1, the patentee has no incentive to engage in refinement.
When the patentee is a pure licensor (u11 = u10 = 0), uˆ
L = F(vˆ)eˆαˆv11. If the
developer will use the technology for sure, i.e., if F(vˆ) = 1 for all vˆ ≥ 0, then by
c
′′′
E ≥ 0, uˆ
L is concave in αˆ. The patentee will not exert refinement effort.
Suppose that technology adoption is not guaranteed, and consider uniform dis-
tribution and quadratic investment cost. Then uˆL = νv411αˆ(1 − αˆ)
3(K/2), and the
second-order derivative is
d2uˆL
dαˆ2
= 6νv311
K
2
(1− αˆ)(2αˆ− 1). (26)
uˆL is strictly concave for αˆ < 1/2 and strictly convex for αˆ > 1/2. The patentee
will have some incentives to engage in refinement when α is at the high end, and no
refinement incentives when α is low enough. To see this, suppose that at the minimal
refinement r, the invention quality α is so high that αˆ0(r) > 1/2, then uˆL is strictly
convex and so UL is strictly increasing in r around r. The patentee will exert some
refinement effort. By contrast, if the invention quality is so low that αˆ1(r) < 1/2, then
UL is strictly decreasing in r around r. By strictly concavity of UL − cR, the patentee
will not exert any refinement effort.
Proposition 5. (Late adoption) Suppose that technology adoption decisions is made after patent
issuance, and Assumption 2 holds so that more refinement encourages technology penetration.
The patentee has no incentives to exert any refinement effort when she wants to monopolize
the technology use, or when the patentee has no downstream market capacity, but technology
adoption is guaranteed for sure.
5 Will Licensing Help?
This section considers how earlier licensing opportunities would affect the patentee’s
refinement incentives (see Figure 4). Assume early adoption, and that Ex post licens-
ing remains as an alternative if no agreement is reached at an earlier stage. However,
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to simplify the analysis, I do not allow interim licensing when considering ex ante li-
censing.
When pi = u10, the patentee prefers the developer to stay out of the market even if
the latter successfully conducts the investment project. If reverse payment is allowed,
then the patentee will pay the developer to exit the market or not use the technology
in the first place. To avoid having to “buy out” the developer, the patentee will not
engage in any refinement in order to discourage technology adoption.23 If reverse
payment is banned, then earlier licensing does not change the developer’s adoption
and investment behavior. The optimal license for the patentee is to mimic what would
happen when only ex post licensing is available. The patentee, therefore, has no incen-
tives to engage in refinement, either.
Proposition 6. (Early licensing and monopolist) When pi = u10 and so the patentee wishes
to discourage technology adoption, she has no incentives to exert any refinement effort even
when early licensing is available.
In the remainder of this section, the patentee is a pure licensor, u10 = u11 = 0.
Under the assumptions that the developer is protected by limited liability and the
investment effort e is not contractible, the type of license the patentee can offer is a
royalty l ∈ [0, 1] such that when the developer’s project succeeds, the patentee gets a
share l · v11.
 Interim licensing: Referring to Figure 4, interim licensing takes place before the
developer’s specific investment but after the patent office issues its decision. Let l0
and l1 be the licensing terms offered by the patentee, given the patent office’s decision
23When the patentee cannot verify the developer’s capacity to adopt the technology and enter into the
market, i.e., when the patentee cannot be sure that the developer will be a real threat to her monopoly,
she may not want to engage in any licensing before the developer has “proven” himself and successfully
completed the project. Earlier licensing becomes irrelevant.
22
aP = 0 and aP = 1, respectively. To induce acceptance, the royalty cannot exceed the
prevailing patent power; there is a participation constraint li ≤ αˆi, i ∈ {0, 1}.
When accepting the offer li, the developer exerts an investment effort eˆ(li), with
payoff vˆ(li). The patentee’s expected licensing income is uˆ(li) = eˆ(li)liv11. Denote l
∗
as the royalty that maximizes the patentee’s expected licensing income in the absence
of the participation constraint:
l∗ ≡ argmax
l
uˆ(l) = eˆ(l)lv11. (27)
Denote uˆ∗ ≡ uˆ(l∗) and vˆ∗ ≡ vˆ(l∗). The following assumption is maintained in this
section.24
Assumption 3. uˆ(l) = leˆ(l)v11 is strictly concave in l and the maximizer l
∗ is a unique
interior solution, l∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Given patent power αˆ, by the strict concavity of uˆ(l), the patentee optimally offers
l∗ if the participation constraint is not binding, and offers αˆ otherwise. Whether l∗
is feasible, then, hinges on the refinement effort r, for it determines both αˆ1 and αˆ0.
When αˆ0 ≥ l∗, the patentee offers l∗ for both examination outcomes. After technology
adoption, the developer’s payoff, vˆ∗, is not affected by the patent office’s decision, and
so is the patentee’s licensing income uˆ∗. The patentee’s payoff at the refinement stage
is F(vˆ∗)uˆ∗ − cR. When αˆ
1
< l∗, the participation constraint li ≤ αˆi is binding for both
i ∈ {0, 1}. The patentee’s payoff from refinement is the same as before, F(V)uτ − cR;
interim licensing is irrelevant.
When αˆ0 < l∗ ≤ αˆ1, the optimal offer l∗ is feasible only when the patent office
issues a favorable decision aP = 1, but not when aP = 0. The developer’s expected
payoff from technology adoption is V in ≡ [qvˆ∗ + (1− q)vˆ(αˆ0)]. Post-adoption, the
patentee’s expected licensing income is uinτ ≡ [quˆ
∗ + (1 − q)uˆ(αˆ0)]. The patentee’s
payoff from refinement is
F
(
qvˆ∗ + (1− q)vˆ(αˆ0)
)[
quˆ∗ + (1− q)uˆ(αˆ0)
]
− cR = F(V
in)uinτ − cR, (28)
which is strictly concave in r due to a sufficiently large c
′′
R.
To consider how interim licensing modifies the patentee’s refinement decision, it
turns out that introducing this opportunity may eliminate the refinement effort from
24The first- and second-order conditions can be found in Section 3, duˆ/dαˆ and d2uˆ/dαˆ2, with αˆ replaced
by l, and setting pi = v11 as well as u11 = u10 = 0. The first-order condition is strictly positive at l = 0 and
strictly negative at l = 1 (for eˆ(1) = 0). The second-order condition is satisfied globally for quadratic cE.
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a patentee with high invention quality α, the one who is supposed to have strong
refinement incentives in the previous case.
Proposition 7. (Interim licensing) Suppose that the patentee is a pure licensor and can offer
an interim license.
When α is large enough so that αˆ0(r) ≥ l∗, the optimal refinement effort is either no
refinement or large enough so that αˆ0 < l∗ < αˆ1. And when
F′(vˆ∗)uˆ∗(1− q)
∂vˆ(αˆ0)
∂αˆ0
∣∣∣∣
αˆ0→l∗−
∂αˆ0
∂r
< c′R, (29)
at r such that αˆ0(r) → l∗−, the patentee will not exert any refinement effort if interim licens-
ing is available. Given l∗ = 1/2, this condition is more likely to hold when α is higher.
When α is small enough so that αˆ1(r) < l∗, then interim licensing will not have significant
negative impact on the refinement effort. That is, it is impossible to have the case where under
interim licensing the optimal refinement is low enough so that αˆ1 < l∗, but without interim
licensing the refinement effort is high enough so that αˆ0 < l∗ < αˆ1.
The analysis suggests that interim licensing may not improve the clarity of patent
rights for a high quality invention (high α). Nevertheless, by alleviating the hold-
up problem it can substitute for the patentee’s refinement activity. To see this, let’s
turn to quadratic investment cost. In this case, given adoption, the average probabil-
ity that the developer will successfully conduct the investment project is qeˆ1 + (1−
q)eˆ0 = (1 − α)Kv11, independent of refinement level. Fixing α and the distribution
function F(·), the degree of technology adoption is thus determined by the devel-
oper’s expected payoff from using the new invention, V(r; α) = (1− α)2Ψv211K/2. By
∂Ψ/∂r > 0, the upper bound of this payoff is thus (1− α)v211K/2, when r = 1.
Suppose that α is so large that αˆ0(r) ≥ l∗ and condition (29) holds, the paten-
tee gives up any refinement activity under interim licensing. This is the case only if
α > l∗ = 1/2. The optimal royalty l∗ = 1/2 thus determines the developer’s payoff,
vˆ∗ = v211K/8. Given adoption, the expected successful probability under interim li-
censing is higher than without it, eˆ(l∗) = Kv11/2 > (1− α)Kv11, for α > 1/2. And the
developer’s payoff will also be greater if α is large enough: v211K/8 ≥ (1− α)v
2
11K/2
whenever α ≥ 3/4. In other words, for α large enough, interim licensing may elimi-
nate refinement without hampering technology diffusion. Note that this comparison
is made by using the highest refinement r = 1 when there is no interim licensing. Any
lower r will only strengthen the result.
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Remark. An interesting result shown in the proof of this proposition is how interim
licensing may change the adoption v.s. revenue trade-off when α > 1/2 and αˆ0(r) <
l∗ < αˆ1(r). When α falls in the middle range such that αˆ0(r) < l∗ < αˆ1(r), the devel-
oper’s and patentee’s post-adoption payoffs are always V in and uinτ , respectively. And
when α > 1/2, I show that ∂V in/∂r > ∂V/∂r and ∂uinτ /∂r > ∂uτ/∂r, that is, interim li-
censing will increase the responsiveness of adoption to refinement while reducing the
negative impact of refinement on the patentee’s post-adoption payoff. Furthermore,
with quadratic investment cost and so l∗ = 1/2, I show that the latter effect may be
so strong that uinτ may be increasing in r for r close to 1/2. In other words, there may
be no more adoption v.s. revenue trade-off. ‖
 Ex ante licensing: Referring to Figure 4, there are two opportunities to offer an
ex ante license, before or after the patentee incurs the refinement efforts. To focus on
the change these licensing opportunities would bring, I do not allow interim licensing
here.
Suppose that ex ante licensing takes place after the patentee chooses the refine-
ment level. Because the adoption cost c f is assumed to be the developer’s private
information, it doesn’t matter to the patentee whether the license is offered before or
after the technology adoption decision is made. Lacking other means of screening
this information, at most one license will be accepted along the equilibrium path.25 In
addition, I assume that even if the developer has taken the license, he can still walk
away at no cost. That is, the patentee cannot impose any fine if the developer decides
not to adopt the patentee’s technology and remains inactive. This is consistent with
the assumptions of limited liability and zero revenue if the developer remains idle.
Let l∗∗ be the optimal value of the following program:
l∗∗ ≡ argmax
l
F
(
vˆ(l)
)
uˆ(l) ⇒ FOC : F′uˆ
∂vˆ
∂l
+ F
∂uˆ
∂l
= 0. (30)
That is, l∗∗ is the optimal licensing term that maximizes the patentee’s expected licens-
ing income when there is only a technology adoption constraint. (If the optimizers are
not unique, choose the smallest one.)26 Because F′ > 0 and ∂vˆ/∂l < 0, the ex ante op-
timal royalty l∗∗ < l∗. Bringing in the technology adoption concern will reduce the
25If two licenses give different adoption payoffs, the developer will surely choose the one with higher
payoff. If two licenses lead to the same adoption payoff for the developer, and thus the same adoption
probability, but different post-adoption revenue for the patentee, the patentee will again choose the one
with higher revenue.
26For simplicity, I assume that the patentee cannot do better by offering random contracts, i.e., (ls)s=1,...,S
25
optimal royalty relative to the case where the developer has already employed the
patentee’s invention.
When offering an ex ante license, the patentee faces a participation constraint that
the developer’s payoff from taking the ex ante license cannot be lower than V(r; α),
what he would expect by rejecting the license and proceeding alone. By ∂V(r; α)/∂r >
0, the payoff V(r; α) attains its minimal value at r = r. Therefore, when α is high
enough such that αˆ0(r) ≥ l∗∗, the optimal royalty l∗∗ is implementable in the absence
of any refinement effort, vˆ(l∗∗) ≥ vˆ(αˆ0(r)) > V(α, r). The patentee will not exert any
refinement effort. This is true as long as vˆ(l∗∗) ≥ V(α, r).
Suppose that vˆ(l∗∗) < V(α, r), and so for all r ∈ [r, 1], V(r; α) > vˆ(l∗∗), the devel-
oper will not accept the royalty l∗∗. Intuitively, the patentee will not exert any refine-
ment effort because more refinement will only increase the developer’s reservation
value V(r; α) and reduce the feasible royalty terms.
To show this result, note that the patentee’s ex ante license offering may contain
two royalties, l0 and l1, contingent on the patent office’s decision aP ∈ {0, 1}. Given
the refinement decision, the patentee can offer (l0, l1) = (αˆ0, αˆ1) that fully replicates
the outcome of no ex ante licensing. There is no loss of generality in assuming that
once the developer has decided to use the patentee’s invention, he will also take the
ex ante license. The following lemma nevertheless shows that when Assumption 3
holds and c
′′′
E ≥ 0, then it is optimal for the patentee to offer a fixed royalty l
0 = l1.
Lemma 2. (Optimal ex ante license) Suppose that Assumption 3 holds and c
′′′
E ≥ 0. The
optimal contract (l0, l1) that solves the program: ∀q,
max
(l0,l1)
quˆ(l1) + (1− q)uˆ(l0)
s.t. qvˆ(l1) + (1− q)vˆ(l0) = v¯,
(31)
has the property that l0 = l1.
By this lemma, the patentee will optimally construct the ex ante license in such a
way that the royalty is invariant in the patent office’s decision, l0 = l1. Let l˜ be the
optimal licensing offer, which must satisfy vˆ(l˜) ≥ V(r; α), where r is the refinement
effort chosen by the patentee at time 1. The patentee’s expected payoff, when making
such that the royalty ls is realizedwith probability qs ∈ (0, 1), with ∑Ss=1 q
s = 1. By the same reasoning, this
can be guaranteed by the same conditions as in Lemma 2 below.
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the refinement decision, is
F
(
vˆ(l˜)
)
uˆ(l˜)− cR, s.t. vˆ(l˜) ≥ V(r; α). (32)
Suppose that the refinement effort r and the subsequent ex ante license are both
chosen at the optimal level. When the patentee exerts some refinement effort, r >
r, the developer’s participation constraint must be binding, vˆ(l˜) = V(r; α). If not,
vˆ(l˜) > V(r; α), then the patentee can marginally reduce the refinement effort, saving
the refinement cost without jeopardizing her ability to offer the same l˜ and receive the
same expected licensing income F(vˆ(l˜))uˆ(l˜).
Obviously, as long as the developer prefers clearer patent rights, ∂V/∂r > 0, the
patenteewill optimally choose not to exert any refinement effort. A higher r requires a
larger cost cR and will raise the developer’s reservation value at the contracting stage,
and thus reduce the feasible set of ex ante contracts. The patentee does not gain from
patent refinement.
Lastly, consider an ex ante license offered before the patentee makes the refinement
effort. If at the contracting stage the patentee can commit to the refinement effort she
will exert later, then previous analysis applies. A higher refinement effort will raise
the developer’s reservation value V(r; α) at the contracting stage. The patentee will
not engage in refinement.
Suppose that the patentee cannot commit to a refinement effort at the bargaining
stage. If the developer refuses the patentee’s licensing offer, then the game continues
as if there is only ex post licensing. Denote rˆ as the patentee’s optimal refinement effort
in that case. The developer is willing to accept an ex ante license when his payoff is
higher than V(α, rˆ). An ex ante license that can fully mimic the outcome without ex
ante licensing, and thuswill be accepted by the developer is: a royalty l0 = αˆ0 (l1 = αˆ1)
is imposed when the patent office issues a decision aP = 0 (aP = 1, respectively).
(And by Lemma 2, to keep the developer’s adoption payoff at V(α, rˆ), the patentee
can do strictly better by offering a constant royalty.) It follows that ex post licensing
will become an off-path event, and the patentee and developer will agree on an ex ante
license. After the agreement, the patentee will no longer exert any refinement effort.
Similar to the case where interim licensing is available, no refinement effort by the
patentee doesn’t mean that the overall technology adoption rate will suffer. Indeed,
in the case where the ex ante licensing takes place before the refinement decision,27 the
27When ex ante licensing takes place after the refinement decision, the optimal royalty is either l∗∗ (when
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fact that the optimal ex ante license l˜ has to satisfy the participation constraint vˆ(l˜) ≥
V(α, rˆ) implies that the technology adoption probability will not be damaged by this
earlier bargaining opportunity. Furthermore, in the case of quadratic investment cost,
without ex ante licensing the probability that the developer will successfully conduct
the investment project is (1− α)Kv11. And by the participation constraint: ∀r > 1/2,
vˆ(l˜) = (1− l˜)2v211
K
2
≥ V(α, rˆ) = (1− α)2Ψv211
K
2
(33)
⇒ (1− l˜)2 ≥ (1− α)2Ψ > (1− α)2, (34)
for ∂Ψ/∂r > 0 whenever r > 1/2 and Ψ = 1 at r = 1/2. The successful probability,
eˆ(l˜) = (1− l˜)v11K, thus, is strictly larger than without ex ante licensing.
Proposition 8. (Ex ante licensing) Suppose that the patentee has no downstream capacity and
offers a license before patent examination. When Assumption 3 holds and the elasticity ξ is
strictly monotonic in l for l ≤ l∗, regardless of the exact timing of the ex ante licensing the
patentee has no incentive to exert any refinement effort.
When ex ante licensing takes place before the refinement decision, the overall probability
that the developer will successfully conduct the downstream investment with the new inven-
tion is higher than that without ex ante licensing.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I investigated a patentee’s incentives to reduce the uncertainty sur-
rounding her patent rights. I showed that, under somemild conditions, the patentee’s
refinement effort is motivated by technology diffusion concerns. But even when the
patentee has no other income than licensing payment, I found that private refinement
effort may vanish when the invention quality α is sufficiently low. This result corre-
sponds to the general perception in the software or e-business industry, where patents
are claimed to be issued to technologies already in the public domain and patent ex-
amination fails to clear the enforceability of these patents in court. I also show that
earlier licensing, in particular at the ex ante stage, could alleviate the hold-up problem
and fully substitute the patentee’s refinement effort without jeopardizing technology
vˆ(l∗∗) ≥ V(α, r)) or l˜ such that vˆ(l˜) = V(α, r) (when vˆ(l∗∗) < V(α, r)). However, the optimal refinement
without ex ante licensing, rˆ, maybe lead to vˆ(l∗∗) < V(α, rˆ). I need further information about rˆ to compare
the effect on technology adoption.
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diffusion. This implies that if I rely on early licensing to mitigate hold-up, then fuzzy
patent rights are something I have to live with.
For future research, the strong assumptions imposed in our model provide quite a
few natural extensions. First, I may expand the model to consider multiple patentees
or multiple developers, or both.28 When there are several patentees, besides deriving
the strategic relationship of refinement decisions, it would be important to let patent-
holders offer interim or even ex ante licenses, jointly or separately. Allowing licensing
would contribute to the literature of standard-setting organization and patent pools
and enhance our understanding of how these collective rights organizations, or IPR
clearinghouses, would affect the overall performance of the patent system. For in-
stance, adding refinement decisions before the formation of a patent pool might help
clarify whether the demand or competition margin will bind, and thus whether a
patent pool is pro-competitive (Lerner and Tirole, 2004).
Second, despite the positive results obtained in Section 5, it might be too optimistic
to assume that early (ex ante) licensing is always available.29 It may well be that not all
potential developers have the same access to ex ante licensing. When it is not available,
our results suggest a policy response to let public decision-makers (the patent office
or court) be the primary source of providing certainty in the patent system.
To introduce the patent office examiner into themodel, I may also want to relax the
assumption that the patentee’s refinement effort has an unbiased effect, r = Pr(aP =
aC) for both aC ∈ {0, 1}. It would be interesting to consider a patentee’s biased incen-
tives to improve the patent power αˆ1 without jeopardizing αˆ0, when the patent office
issues an unfavorable decision (Meurer and Bessen, 2006). If this is true, and if the
patent examination remains an ex parte procedure, then patent examiners should be
provided with adequate incentives to counter this bias and raise the informativeness
of issued patents in the other side. That is, I might consider introducing some “ad-
28In an earlier version of the paper, I attempted a preliminary analysis with two patent-holders, and
showed that when the two inventions are perfect complements and perfect substitutes, as well as under the
special cases of quadratic investment cost and uniform distribution for the adoption cost, the two patent-
holders’ refinement decisions are strategic complements.
29For instance, in the U.S. early publication is not mandatory as long as there are (or will be) no foreign
equivalent applications filed in countries where early publication will take place. In this case, a poten-
tial developer will have difficulty searching for relevant patent applications and seeking a license before
patents are granted. Even under the early publication requirement (e.g. European Union and Japan), it
typically happens eighteen months after the patentee files the patent application. Because the twenty-year
patent term begins with the filing date, a patentee may not want to wait until after publication to start the
examination process.
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vocacy” elements into patent examination, with the patentee and examiner searching
for information to support opposite causes (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999).
Concerning the role of the court, a similar extension could be introduced at the
litigation stage. That is, I could consider a situation where both aP and aC are signals
about a “true” patent boundary, which has a true value 1 (i.e., the patentee should
get the exclusive power of the technology) with probability α. The probability dis-
tribution of aP is affected by the patentee’s as well as the examiner’s efforts, while
that of aC is affected by the litigation inputs of the patentee and potential infringer
or patent challenger in court. I can then use this framework to re-examine the “ra-
tional ignorance” hypothesis and consider the optimal division of labor between the
patent office and private challengers to improve the performance of the patent system
(Lemley, 2001; Chiou, 2008).
Appendix
A Proofs
 Lemma 1
Proof. Fix α ∈ (0, 1) and suppose that δ(αˆ) is strictly convex in αˆ. By strictly convexity,
for any r > 1/2, ∆(r) > ∆(1/2). Consider any r and r˜ such that 1 ≥ r > r˜ > 1/2.
Denote q ≡ αr + (1− α)(1 − r), αˆ1 ≡ αr/q, and αˆ0 ≡ α(1− r)/(1 − q). Similarly,
denote q˜ ≡ αr˜+ (1− α)(1− r˜), α˜1 ≡ αˆ1(r˜) = αr˜/q˜, and α˜0 ≡ αˆ0(r˜) = α(1− r˜)/(1− q˜).
Because r > r˜, αˆ1 > α˜1 > α˜0 > αˆ0.
To show that ∆(r) = qδ(αˆ1) + (1− q)δ(αˆ0) > ∆(r˜) = q˜δ(α˜1) + (1− q˜)δ(α˜0), define
δ˜(αˆ) =
{
δ(αˆ) if αˆ ∈ [0, α˜0) ∪ (α˜1, 1],
αˆ−α˜0
α˜1−α˜0
δ(α˜1) + α˜
1−αˆ
α˜1−α˜0
δ(α˜0) if αˆ ∈ [α˜0, α˜1].
(A.1)
That is, on the space of (αˆ, δ(αˆ)), δ˜ is constructed by replacing δ with the convex
combination of (α˜1, δ(α˜1)) and (α˜0, δ(α˜0)) for αˆ ∈ [α˜0, α˜1]; and keep δ˜ = δ otherwise.
By the way it is constructed, δ˜ is convex, though not strictly convex due to the linear
part of αˆ ∈ [α˜0, α˜1]. By convexity,
∆(r) = qδ(αˆ1) + (1− q)δ(αˆ0) = qδ˜(αˆ1) + (1− q)δ˜(αˆ0) ≥ δ˜(qαˆ1 + (1− q)αˆ0) = δ˜(α);
(A.2)
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and by convex combination,
∆(r˜) = q˜δ(α˜1) + (1− q˜)δ(α˜0) = q˜δ˜(α˜1) + (1− q˜)δ˜(α˜0) = δ˜(q˜α˜1 + (1− q˜)α˜0) = δ˜(α).
(A.3)
Thus ∆(r) ≥ ∆(r˜). To show strict inequality, because δ is strictly convex in αˆ,
δ(α˜1) > δ(α˜0) +
dδ
dαˆ
∣∣
α˜0
· (α˜1 − α˜0) and δ(α˜0) > δ(α˜1) +
dδ
dαˆ
∣∣
α˜1
· (α˜0 − α˜1), (A.4)
or, equivalently,
dδ
dαˆ
∣∣
α˜0
< γ ≡
δ(α˜1)− δ(α˜0)
α˜1 − α˜0
<
dδ
dαˆ
∣∣
α˜1
. (A.5)
The slope of the line connecting (α˜0, δ(α˜0)) and (α˜1, δ(α˜1)), γ, lies between the slope
of δ when evaluated at α˜0 and α˜1. Extend the line to the interval [αˆ0, αˆ1], that is, let
δ˜(αˆ1) = δ(α˜1) + γ(αˆ1 − α˜1) and δ˜(αˆ0) = δ(α˜0) − γ(α˜0 − αˆ0). By condition (A.5) and
the strict convexity of δ,
δ˜(αˆ1) < δ(α˜1) +
dδ
dαˆ
∣∣
α˜1
· (αˆ1 − α˜1) < δ(αˆ1), (A.6)
and
δ˜(αˆ0) < δ(α˜0)−
dδ
dαˆ
∣∣
α˜0
· (α˜0 − αˆ0) < δ(αˆ0). (A.7)
Therefore,
∆(r) = qδ(αˆ1) + (1− q)δ(αˆ0) > qδ˜(αˆ1) + (1− q)δ˜(αˆ0) > δ˜(qαˆ1 + (1− q)αˆ0) = δ˜(α) = ∆(r˜).
(A.8)
By the same reasoning, when δ is strictly concave in αˆ, then ∆ is strictly decreasing in
r Q.E.D.
 Example 1:
Proof. Given quadratic investment cost, it is straightforward to derive αˆ and vˆ, and so
V(r; α) =
{
q
[
(1− α)(1− r)
q
]2
+ (1− q)
[
(1− α)r
1− q
]2}
v211
K
2
=
[
(1− r)2
q
+
r2
1− q
]
(1− α)2v211
K
2
= Ψ(1− α)2v211
K
2
.
(A.9)
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For all r > 1/2 and α ∈ (0, 1),
∂Ψ
∂r
=
rq− (1− r)(1− q)
q2(1− q)2
{
2q(1− q) + [rq+ (1− r)(1− q)]
∂q
∂r
}
=
α2[r− (1− r)]
q2(1− q)2
> 0.
(A.10)
A higher refinement effort encourages technology adoption.
It is also straightforward to get the patentee’s post adoption payoff. Similarly, for
all r > 1/2 and α ∈ (0, 1),
∂Λ
∂r
=
1
q2(1− q)2
[
(1− r− r)q(1− q)− r(1− r)(1− q− q)
∂q
∂r
]
= −(1− α)
α[r− (1− r)]
q2(1− q)2
< 0,
(A.11)
a higher refinement effort reduces the patentee’s post-adoption payoff. The first-older
condition to determine the optimal r is
∂U
∂r
= α(1− α)v211KF(V)
{
F′
F
(V)
V
Ψ
Λ
∂Ψ
∂r
+
∂Λ
∂r
}
− c′R
= α2(1− α)2v211KF(V)
[r− (1− r)]
q2(1− q)2
{
F′
F
(V)V
αΛ
(1− α)Ψ
− 1
}
− c′R.
(A.12)
The necessary and sufficient condition for the patentee to exert r > r is
F′
F
(V)V
αΛ
(1− α)Ψ
> 1 ⇒
F′
F
(V)V >
(1− α)Ψ
αΛ
, (A.13)
when evaluating r = r. To show that the right-hand side of the condition is decreasing
in α:
(1− α)Ψ
αΛ
=
(1− α)[(1− r)2(1− q) + r2q]
αr(1− r)
, (A.14)
and so
∂
∂α
(
(1− α)Ψ
αΛ
)
=
−1
α2r(1− r)
{
α
[
(1− r)2(1− q) + r2q+ (1− α)(1− r)2(2r− 1)
− (1− α)r2(2r− 1)] + (1− α)
[
(1− r)2(1− q) + r2q
] }
.
(A.15)
The numerator, by the definitions of q and 1− q and by expressing
αr3 = α2r3 + α(1− α)r3 and α(1− r)3 = α2(1− r)3 + α(1− α)(1− r)3, (A.16)
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is:
α(1− α)r2(1− r) + α(1− α)r(1− r)2 − α2(1− r)3 − (1− α)r(1− r)2 − α2r3
− (1− α)r2(1− r)− 2α(1− α)r(1− r)
=− α(1− α)r(1− r)− (1− α)r(1− r)− α2[r3 + (1− r)3] < 0.
(A.17)
Q.E.D.
 Proposition 4
Proof. Consider soft information. When the patentee has type αˆi, i ∈ {0, 1}, and the
developer believes that her type is α˜, given developer’s investment, the patentee’s
payoff is uˆ(eˆ(α˜); αˆi) = u10 + eˆ(α˜)D(αˆ
i). By αˆ1 > αˆ0 and pi > u11, D(αˆ
1) > D(αˆ0), but
D(αˆi) ≷ 0, i ∈ {0, 1}. In a separating equilibrium, different types of patentee send
different reports and the developer learns the true type. Since there is no restriction
on the message space, one type of the patentee can perfectly mimic the other type.
The incentive constraints are
uˆ(eˆ(αˆ1); αˆ1) ≥ uˆ(eˆ(αˆ0); αˆ1) ⇒
[
eˆ(αˆ1)− eˆ(αˆ0)
]
D(αˆ1) ≥ 0, (A.18)
and
uˆ(eˆ(αˆ0); αˆ0) ≥ uˆ(eˆ(αˆ1); αˆ0) ⇒
[
eˆ(αˆ0)− eˆ(αˆ1)
]
D(αˆ0) ≥ 0. (A.19)
The two conditions require that
[
eˆ(αˆ1)− eˆ(αˆ0)
]
· [D(αˆ1) − D(αˆ0)] ≥ 0. But this is
impossible by D(αˆ1) > D(αˆ0) and eˆ(αˆ1) < eˆ(αˆ0). There is no separating equilibrium.
In a pooling equilibrium, along the equilibrium path both types of patentee send
the same report; the developer’s belief remains at the ex ante level, α = qαˆ1 + (−q)αˆ0,
and exerts investment eˆ(α) ∈ (eˆ(αˆ1), eˆ(αˆ0)). Suppose that the developer holds belief
α˜ when observing the off-path report, i.e., the report that should not be sent in equi-
librium. The patentee’s incentive constraint is [eˆ(α)− eˆ(α˜)]D(αˆi), i ∈ {0, 1}. The in-
centive constraint holds when the developer holds “passive” belief, i.e., he thinks that
both types of patentee have the same incentive to deviate, and so α˜ = α. Alternatively,
if D(αˆi) < 0 for both i ∈ {0, 1} (as in the case of pi = u10), then the incentive constraint
holds with α˜ = αˆ0; and if D(αˆi) > 0 for both i ∈ {0, 1} (as in the case of u10 = u11 = 0),
then it holds with α˜ = αˆ1. When the pooling equilibrium prevails for all r, given adop-
tion, the patentee’s expected payoff is quˆ(eˆ(α); αˆ1) + (1− q)uˆ(eˆ(α); αˆ0) = uˆ(eˆ(α); α).
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Since refinement affects neither the post-adoption payoff nor the developer’s incen-
tive to adopt, the ruler will not exert any refinement effort.
To show that there is always a separating equilibrium under hard information,
suppose that one type of patentee, say, αˆ1, reveals her information. Since the other
type αˆ0 cannot mimic by submitting the same information, and since the developer
knows that the patentee always knows something, i.e., there is no type ∅ such that
the patentee’s own assessment about the patent power remains at the ex ante level,
whichever the message the type αˆ0 sends, the developer can perfectly figure out her
true type. There is no feasible deviation from the truth-telling equilibrium.
In a pooling equilibrium, the two types of patentee must send the same message
∅, and the developer’s equilibrium belief remains at the ex ante level α. Since the only
feasible deviation fully reveals the patentee’s type, the incentive constraints are, for
both i ∈ {0, 1},
uˆ(eˆ(α); αˆi) ≥ uˆ(eˆ(αˆi); αˆi) ⇒
[
eˆ(α)− eˆ(αˆi)
]
D(αˆi) ≥ 0. (A.20)
By eˆ(αˆ0) > eˆ(α) > eˆ(αˆ1), the two constraints require that D(αˆ1) ≥ 0 ≥ D(αˆ0). Without
entirely eliminating the uncertainty, i.e., when r < 1 and so αˆ1 < 1 as well as αˆ0 > 0,
this is not possible when the patentee either wants to monopolize the technology use
or is a pure licensor. In the former case, pi = u10, D
(αˆi) < 0 for both i ∈ {0, 1}; and in
the latter case, pi = v11 and u11 = u10 = 0, D(αˆ
i) > 0 for both i ∈ {0, 1}.
To have a pooling equilibrium, it is necessary to have pi > u10 > u11 and a suf-
ficiently high refinement effort r such that αˆ1 is large while αˆ0 is small enough. In a
pooling equilibrium, the developer fixes his investment level at eˆ(α), according to the
ex ante belief α, and so his adoption probability is F(V(α, r = 1/2)), despite the paten-
tee’s high effort. The patentee’s post-adoption payoff becomes uˆ(α). When uˆ(α) is
strictly concave in α, this payoff is higher than the expected payoff under the sep-
arating equilibrium, quˆ(αˆ1) + (1 − q)uˆ(αˆ0). Suppose that the pooling equilibrium
prevails when it exists. The patentee’s refinement decision then is shaped by two
regimes. When r is small enough such that there is only the separating equilibrium,
previous analysis holds. And once r is large enough such to reach the pooling equilib-
rium, the patentee has no incentive to further raise refinement effort. The patentee’s
optimal refinement level then is determined by comparing the highest payoff in the
two regimes. Note that, when deciding whether to reach the pooling equilibrium,
the patentee faces the same trade-off, but the impact of r goes in the opposite direc-
tion as before. A sufficiently high refinement effort that induces pooling equilibrium
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will reduce the developer’s adoption incentives, but raise the patentee’s post-adoption
payoff. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 5
Proof. For the second-order effect of patent power on technology penetration,
d2
dαˆ2
F(vˆ)eˆ = F
′′
(vˆ)eˆ
(
dvˆ
dαˆ
)2
+ 2F
′
(vˆ)
deˆ
dαˆ
dvˆ
dαˆ
+ F
′
(vˆ)eˆ
d2vˆ
dαˆ2
+ F(vˆ)
d2 eˆ
dαˆ2
. (A.21)
Because deˆ/dαˆ and dvˆ/dαˆ have the same sign, the penetration probability is convex in
αˆ if the sign of d2F(vˆ)eˆ/dαˆ2 is not dominated by F
′′
and d2 eˆ/dαˆ2. It is satisfied under
uniform distribution and quadratic investment cost, where F
′′
= d2 eˆ/dαˆ2 = 0.
For the patentee, when pi = u10,
duˆL
dαˆ
= (u10 − u11)
[
F(vˆ)eˆ− (1− αˆ)
d
dαˆ
F(vˆ)eˆ
]
> 0, and (A.22)
d2uˆL
dαˆ2
= (u10 − u11)
[
2
d
dαˆ
F(vˆ)eˆ− (1− αˆ)
d2
dαˆ2
F(vˆ)eˆ
]
< 0. (A.23)
When u11 = u10 = 0, uˆ
L = F(vˆ)eˆαˆv11, and
duˆL
dαˆ
= v11
[
F(vˆ)eˆ+ αˆ
d
dαˆ
F(vˆ)eˆ
]
and
d2uˆL
dαˆ2
= v11
[
2
d
dαˆ
F(vˆ)eˆ+ αˆ
d2
dαˆ2
F(vˆ)eˆ
]
. (A.24)
If F(vˆ) = 1 for all vˆ ≥ 0, then
d2uˆL
dαˆ2
= v11
(
2
deˆ
dαˆ
+ αˆ
d2 eˆ
dαˆ2
)
= v11
[
2
deˆ
dαˆ
+ αˆ
v11c
′′′
E
(c
′′
E)
2
deˆ
dαˆ
]
. (A.25)
By c
′′′
E ≥ 0, uˆ
L is globally concave. Suppose that technology adoption is not guar-
anteed, and consider uniform distribution and quadratic investment cost. Given
these forms, the optimal eˆ = (1 − αˆ)Kv11 and vˆ = (1 − αˆ)
2v211(K/2), and so uˆ
L =
νv411αˆ(1− αˆ)
3(K/2). Q.E.D.
 Proposition 6
Proof. Suppose that reverse payment is feasible. When the patentee offers an interim
license, given the patent power αˆ, the developer has an outside option value vˆ(αˆ). An
interim license has to leave the developer at least an expected payoff vˆ(αˆ). Since pi =
u10 ≥ u11 + v11, the upper bound of the patentee’s payoff is pi − vˆ(αˆ) = u10 − vˆ(αˆ).
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This payoff can be achieved by paying the developer his outside option value and ask
him not to make any investment.
Anotherway to see this is to consider themost general license (x, f 0, f 1, f 2), where
x is the probability that the developer enters the market, given that his project suc-
ceeds, and f 0 is the payment from the patentee to the developer when the latter’s
project fails, f 1 the payment when the project succeeds but the patentee asks the de-
veloper not to enter, and f 2 the payment when the project succeeds and the devel-
oper enters. By limited liability constraint for both parties, f 0 and f 1 ∈ [0, u10] while
f 2 ∈ [−v11, u11].
The patentee’s optimization problem is
max (1− eˆx)u10 + eˆxu11 − [(1− eˆ) f
0 + eˆx f 2 + eˆ(1− x) f 1]
s.t. (IC) : eˆ = argmax
e
(1− e) f 0 + e[x(v11 + f
2) + (1− x) f 1]− cE(e)
(IR) : (1− eˆ) f 0 + eˆ[x(v11 + f
2) + (1− x) f 1]− cE(eˆ) ≥ vˆ(αˆ).
(A.26)
It is straightforward to show that the developer’s participation constraint must be
binding. This in turn implies that the optimal investment induced by the optimal
interim license is eˆ = 0, for u10 ≥ u11 + v11 and a higher eˆ and thus cE(eˆ) makes
the (IR) constraint more stringent. In other words, the patentee should just pay the
developer f 0 = vˆ(αˆ) so that no investment will be made.
At the refinement stage, the patentee’s expected payoff is thus [1 − F(V)]u10 +
F(V)(u10 − V)− cR = u10 − F(V)V − cR, for, given adoption, the expected payment
to the developer is qvˆ(αˆ1) + (1− q)vˆ(αˆ0) = V. Since a higher refinement will increase
the payment V and the adoption probability F(V), the patentee will optimally choose
no refinement and leave r = r.
When the patentee offers an ex ante license, by similar logic the patentee will want
to pay the developer not to enter the market. If the license is offered after the refine-
ment decision, then the patentee will choose the minimal possible refinement level,
r = r, in order to minimize the expected licensing payment F(V)V. And if the license
is offered before the refinement decision, then again the developer’s outside option
value is F(V)V. After paying the developer for a promise not to adopt the technol-
ogy, the patentee does not have any incentive to make any refinement. If the patentee
cannot commit to the refinement effort she will incur later, then the ex ante payment to
the developer is negotiated with the belief that the patentee will exert r = r later. But
even if the patentee can commit to r, she will want to commit to the smallest possible
level in order to lower F(V)V.
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Suppose that reverse payment is not feasible. Either the patentee will not make
any licensing offer, or, in case where a license is offered, the developer pays the paten-
tee when his project succeeds and he enters the market. In the previous construction,
when the patentee can offer an interim license, forbidding reverse payment requires
that f 0 = f 1 = 0 and f 2 ∈ [−v11, 0]. Redefine f
2 = −lv11, with l ∈ [0, 1], i.e., f
2 is
the royalty rate paid by the developer. Then the developer’s (IR) constraint becomes
x(1− l) ≥ (1− αˆ), which should be binding at optimum. The patentee’s expected
payoff, given a biding participation constraint, is u10 − eˆx(u10 − u11 − v11) − eˆ(1 −
αˆ)v11, where eˆ depends only on 1− αˆ (but not on x and l). The optimal contract is
x∗ = 1− αˆ and l∗ = 0. That is, even when successful the developer is allowed to enter
only with probability 1− αˆ and no royalty is paid. The optimal interim license fully
mimics the outcome of the case where no such licensing opportunity is available. In
other words, the patentee may just forgo interim licensing. The no refinement result
then follows previous discussion.
Similarly, the patentee will just forgo ex ante licensing, and thus the no refinement
result is not affected by this licensing opportunity. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 7
Proof. Let us consider three cases according to the level of α. When αˆ0(r) ≥ l∗, i.e., the
invention quality α is high enough so that at r = r, the patent power is strong enough
to support the optimal royalty l∗ even when the patent office issues an unfavorable
decision aP = 0. (A necessary condition is α ≥ l∗.) The patentee’s expected payoff
from refinement is30
Uin =


F(vˆ∗)uˆ∗ − cR, if l
∗ ≤ αˆ0 < αˆ1,
F(V in)uinτ − cR, if αˆ
0
< l∗ < αˆ1.
(A.27)
When the refinement effort is so low that l∗ ≤ αˆ0 ≤ αˆ0(r), the patentee can charge l∗
regardless of the patent office’s decision. And if the patentee chooses r large enough
such that αˆ0 < l∗ < αˆ1, then l∗ is feasible only when the patent office issues a favorable
decision to the patentee, aP = 1.
To find the optimal r, first notice that when l∗ ≤ αˆ0, the revenue is not affected by
30Because at r > 1/2, αˆ1(r) > αˆ0(r) ≥ l∗, further increase r will cause αˆ1 > l∗.
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r, and so the optimal r = r over this range. It follows that if ∂Uin./∂r ≤ 0 as αˆ0 → l∗−:
∂Uin
∂r
∣∣∣∣
αˆ0→l∗−
=F′
[
quˆ∗ + (1− q)uˆ(αˆ0)
][
(vˆ∗ − vˆ(αˆ0))
∂q
∂r
+ (1− q)
∂vˆ(αˆ0)
∂αˆ0
∂αˆ0
∂r
]
+ F
[
(uˆ∗ − uˆ(αˆ0))
∂q
∂r
+ (1− q)
∂uˆ(αˆ0)
∂αˆ0
∂αˆ0
∂r
]
− c′R
=F′(vˆ∗)uˆ∗(1− q)
∂vˆ(αˆ0)
∂αˆ0
∣∣∣∣
αˆ0→l∗−
∂αˆ0
∂r
− c′R ≤ 0,
(A.28)
then under interim licensing the patentee will not exert any refinement effort, the op-
timal r = r.
Condition (29) is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition to reach no refinement
from the patentee. If it fails, I need to compare
F(vˆ∗)uˆ∗ ≷ max
r
F(V in)uinτ − cR (A.29)
to determine the optimal r. The optimal r then exhibits a “bang-bang” property: It is
either r or “jumps” to some level large enough such that αˆ0 < l∗ < αˆ1.
Consider when condition (29) is more likely to hold. A higher α will require a
larger r to reach the same level of αˆ0, i.e.,
∂αˆ0
∂α
dα +
∂αˆ0
∂r
dr = 0 ⇒
dr
dα
= −
∂αˆ0/∂α
∂αˆ0/∂r
=
r(1− r)
α(1− α)
> 0. (A.30)
On the revenue side, when evaluating at αˆ0 = l∗,
−(1− q)
∂αˆ0
∂r
=
α(1− α)
1− q
= αˆ0
1− α
1− r
= l∗
1− α
1− r
, (A.31)
thus to keep αˆ0 = l∗,
∂
∂α
(
1− α
1− r
)dα +
∂
∂r
(
1− α
1− r
)dr =
−1
1− r
(
1+
1− α
1− r
∂αˆ0/∂α
∂αˆ0/∂r
)
dα =
−dα
1− r
(
1−
r
α
)
.
(A.32)
And from αˆ0 = l∗, I can find α = rl∗/[rl∗ + (1− r)(1− l∗)], and therefore α ≥ r if and
only if l∗ ≥ 1/2 (with quadratic investment cost, l∗ = 1/2). I can conclude that when
l∗ ≥ 1/2, condition (29) is more likely to hold for high values of α.
Next, when α is in an intermediate range such that αˆ0(r) < l∗ ≤ αˆ1(r), then for all
r ≥ r, the patentee’s payoff is
Uin = F(V in)uinτ − cR, (A.33)
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for a higher r will still cause l∗ to stay in the open interval (αˆ0, αˆ1). The first-order
conditio to determine the optimal refinement effort is
∂Uin
∂r
=F′ ·
[
quˆ∗ + (1− q)uˆ(αˆ0)
][
(vˆ∗ − vˆ(αˆ0))
∂q
∂r
+ (1− q)
∂vˆ(αˆ0)
∂αˆ0
∂αˆ0
∂r
]
+ F ·
[
(uˆ∗ − uˆ(αˆ0))
∂q
∂r
+ (1− q)
∂uˆ(αˆ0)
∂αˆ0
∂αˆ0
∂r
]
− c′R.
(A.34)
Comparing with the case where only ex post licensing is allowed, the opportunity of
interim licensing raises both the developer’s and patentee’s expected payoffs upon
adoption. It also changes how these payoffs will respond to the refinement effort,
∂V in
∂r
−
∂V
∂r
=
[
vˆ∗ − vˆ(αˆ1)
] ∂q
∂r
− q
∂vˆ(αˆ1)
∂αˆ1
∂αˆ1
∂r
, (A.35)
∂uinτ
∂r
−
∂uτ
∂r
=
[
uˆ∗ − uˆ(αˆ1)
] ∂q
∂r
− q
∂uˆ(αˆ1)
∂αˆ1
∂αˆ1
∂r
. (A.36)
When α ≥ 1/2 and so ∂q/∂r ≥ 0, interim licensing will make the developer’s payoff
more responsive to the refinement effort, ∂V in/∂r > ∂V/∂r, and reduce the negative
impact of refinement effort on the patentee’s licensing income, ∂uinτ /∂r > ∂uτ/∂r.
In fact, it may even happen that the refinement effort will increase licensing income,
∂uinτ /∂r > 0. To see this, consider the case of quadratic investment cost, under which
the optimal royalty is l∗ = 1/2 and so uˆ = Kv211/4. The expected licensing payment
is
uinτ =
[q
4
+ (1− q)αˆ0(1− αˆ0)
]
Kv211 =
[
q
4
+ α(1− α)
r(1− r)
1− q
]
Kv211. (A.37)
The impact of r on uinτ is proportional to
∂
∂r
[
q
4
+ α(1− α)
r(1− r)
1− q
]
=
α− (1− α)
4
+
α(1− α)
(1− q)2
[(1− r− r)(1− q) + r(1− r)(α− (1− α))],
(A.38)
which is positive when α > 1/2 and r → 1/2 (assuming r is sufficiently close to 1/2).
In this case, the adoption v.s. revenue tradeoff will disappear, and the patentee will
have higher incentives to engage in refinement.
Lastly, when α is small enough so that αˆ1(r) < l∗, the patentee’s expected payoff
from refinement is
Uin. =


F(V)uτ − cR, if l
∗
> αˆ1 > αˆ0,
F(V in)uinτ − cR, if αˆ
0
< l∗ ≤ αˆ1.
(A.39)
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With low refinement interim licensing is irrelevant regardless of the patent office’s
decision. And only r is large enough so that αˆ0 < l∗ ≤ αˆ1 could the patentee offer l∗
after a decision aP = 1.
The same as in the high α case, I can check the first-order condition at the bound-
ary between the two regimes to gain some information about the optimal refinement
effort. Here it should be evaluated at αˆ1 → l∗+:
∂Uin
∂r
∣∣∣∣
αˆ1→l∗+
=F′ ·
[
quˆ∗ + (1− q)uˆ(αˆ0)
][
(vˆ∗ − vˆ(αˆ0))
∂q
∂r
+ (1− q)
∂vˆ(αˆ0)
∂αˆ0
∂αˆ0
∂r
]
+ F ·
[
(uˆ∗ − uˆ(αˆ0))
∂q
∂r
+ (1− q)
∂uˆ(αˆ0)
∂αˆ0
∂αˆ0
∂r
]
− c′R.
(A.40)
If this term is (weakly) negative, then the optimal refinement effort falls into the lower
end. Furthermore, comparing the first-order conditions with and without interim li-
censing at αˆ1 → l∗+ shows that
∂Uin
∂r
∣∣∣∣
αˆ→l∗+
−
∂U
∂r
∣∣∣∣
αˆ=l∗
= −F′ ·
[
quˆ∗ + (1− q)uˆ(αˆ0)
]
q
∂vˆ(αˆ1)
∂αˆ1
∣∣∣∣
αˆ=l∗
∂αˆ1
∂r
> 0. (A.41)
The first-order condition jumps upward at the point αˆ1 = l∗. I can conclude that in
this case interim licensing will not discourage too much the refinement effort, if ever.
That is, if without interim licensing the optimal rˆ is large enough so that αˆ0 < l∗ < αˆ1,
then interim licensing will maintain a refinement effort such that the relation αˆ0 <
l∗ < αˆ1 still holds. Conversely, when expression (A.40) is (weakly) negative so that
the optimal refinement effort under interim licensing falls into the low range such that
l∗ > αˆ1 > αˆ0, then it would already be the case without interim licensing. Q.E.D.
 Lemma 2
Proof. By the concavity of uˆ in l (Assumption 3), the optimal li ≤ l∗, i ∈ {0, 1}. If some
li > l∗, then ∂uˆ/∂li < 0 and a small reduction in li will increase both the patentee’s
and developer’s payoffs.
Suppose that l0 6= l1. Consider a small change of royalties, (dl0, dl1), that keeps
the constraint satisfied:
q
∂vˆ
∂l1
dl1 + (1− q)
∂vˆ
∂l0
dl0 = 0 ⇒ dl0 = −
q(∂vˆ/∂l1)
(1− q)(∂vˆ/∂l0)
dl1. (A.42)
This will change the objective function by
q
∂uˆ
∂l1
dl1 + (1− q)
∂uˆ
∂l0
dl0 = qdl1
∂uˆ
∂l0
(
∂uˆ/∂l1
∂uˆ/∂l0
−
∂vˆ/∂l1
∂vˆ/∂l0
)
, (A.43)
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where ∂uˆ/∂l = [eˆ + l(∂eˆ/∂l)]v and ∂vˆ/∂l = −eˆv. When both l0 and l1 are in the
interval (0, l∗] ⊂ (0, 1) but l0 6= l1, say, l0 < l1, then
∂uˆ(l1)/∂l1
∂uˆ(l0)/∂l0
−
∂vˆ(l1)/∂l1
∂vˆ(l0)/∂l0
=
eˆ(l1) + l1 ∂eˆ(l
1)
∂l1
eˆ(l0) + l0 ∂eˆ(l
0)
∂l0
−
eˆ(l1)
eˆ(l0)
=
1
eˆ(l0)(∂uˆ/∂l0)
[
eˆ(l0)l1
∂eˆ(l1)
∂l1
− eˆ(l1)l0
∂eˆ(l0)
∂l0
]
=
eˆ(l1)
∂uˆ/∂l0
[ξ(l1)− ξ(l0)],
(A.44)
where ξ ≡ (l/eˆ)(∂eˆ/∂l) = −(l/eˆ)[v/c
′′
E(eˆ)] is the elasticity of investment effort eˆ with
respect to the royalty l. By
∂ξ
∂l
= −
v
eˆ(c
′′
E)
2
[
eˆc
′′
E − l
∂eˆ
∂l
(c
′′
E + eˆc
′′′
E )
]
, (A.45)
when c
′′′
E ≥ 0, the elasticity is strictly monotonic in l for l ≤ l
∗. In this case, whenever
l0 6= l1, there is a pair of feasible changes (dl0, dl1) that can increase the value of the
objective function. It can’t be optimal.
If some element, say, l0 hits the boundary point 0, i.e., l0 = 0 < l1 ≤ l∗, then
eˆ(l0)l1
∂eˆ(l1)
∂l1
− eˆ(l1)l0
∂eˆ(l0)
∂l0
= eˆ(l0)l1
∂eˆ(l1)
∂l1
< 0. (A.46)
A feasible pair of changes that will increase the patentee’s payoff is dl1 < 0 and dl0 = 0
such that the constraint still holds. Q.E.D.
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